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It is totally unfair to owner pilots to say they all suck. Miller has assured AOPA that the issue has been forwarded all the way up the chain to Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, who is apparently working to correct it. I lost 15 pounds the first month and have been following it to a T. The proposals would effectively eliminate the ability to give rides in the USA. If I guaranteed no more shipments are coming to my name or my address that should be the end of the story, not with them! Witnesses reported hearing the sound of an engine sputtering prior to the crash. While their Basic plan worked for me for me, they have several options to choose from.
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Explore this item Specifications Brand Nutrisystem. Had my first shake today. I am not sure what I expected but thought it would be a little more legit, like the rest of the food. I would rather have a choc. Sissy, September 7, Written by a customer while visiting nutrisystem. This is great using a Stick Blender. Tastes like a chocolate shake. You could have seen or heard the crash if you were on the Cod's deck that Night I bet as you could have seen the Cessna take off as well.
Yesterday I had a long chat with an old Delta Airlines pilot that retired many years ago. We talked about heated wing leading edges and bleed air and he said that when he used to take off in icing conditions, the ice protection wasn't turned on until after takeoff. The reason was that the bleed air robbed the engine providing the hot compressed air of thrust. He also said that the ice protection was turned off just before landing in order that the leading edges wouldn't be excessively hot at the gate.
The concern was that ground personnel could burn themselves if they should touch the heated surfaces. Does anybody here know what the common thinking concerning turning on and turning off ice protection is currently? What do type rating instructors teach or recommend? Is it a bad idea to turn on the ice protection prior to takeoff? Given the power to weight ratio of the CJ4, does the ice protection system being on rob the engines of all that much power?
This seems to be a critical issue! I've been seeing a recurring theme with many business jet crashes in recent years, low time, single pilot.
Having another pilot in the cockpit could prevent many of these tragedies. Maybe it's time the FAA takes a look at how they issue single pilot type ratings. You'd think insurance companies would be more restrictive on this maybe requiring a second pilot at least for low time pilots but maybe they enjoy paying out when tragedies like this happen.
There's a lot to be gained from flying with another experienced pilot. On December 29th the high was 39F, the mean temperature was 36F, and it was 33F at the time of the accident.
Total precip for the day was only 0. As a current pilot with 35 years of flying under my belt I find it a stretch that, given these meteorological conditions, that any icing was present and even if there was some icing happening there certainly wouldn't be enough ice accumulation even assuming he had deice off in under 3 minutes of flight time to disrupt airflow enough to cause an aerodynamic stallhe kept his speed up too.
As I posted before, turning out away from the city lights from Burke at night, with no stars or moon presents zero horizon for visual situational awareness. After a huge adrenalin rush I quickly did what all pilots are trained to do when entering the clouds or losing visual reference and that is going to the artificial horizon. I completed my standard rate turn until the shoreline lights came into view and continued normal VFR night operations southbound along I out of Burke's airspace.
My prediction is that the flight data recorder and aircraft performance numbers will show everything working perfectlybut with a JFK Jr. Dear "Yesterday I had a long chat", all performance calqulations are predicated on loosing one engine on takeoff. If one were to fail, you need ALL of the thrust possible from the operating engine. Most people have never had this topic explaned.
Jets have way more thrust than necessary with all engines operating. It is interesting that no one posting on this thread is giving much credence to the possibility of the pilot having a heart attack, or some type of medical emergency. Yes turning on wing heat robs some bleed air from the engines.
Generally this is not an issue in a CJ4 as it has plenty of power. It would not have posed a problem for the accident airplane taking off from Burke. Dear "Yesterday I had a long chat". From the comments I am guessing no. I'll let the NTSB break the news next year.
There are opposing opinions here and I want to sort through them and assign probabilities, as if I'm an accident investigator like I could have been. The idea that maybe the pilot had a heart attack has some merit, but considering that he was 46, that's rather early for a sudden catastrophic myocardial infarction.
Usually there are indications that a heart attack is about to happen such as a feeling similar to indigestion. From takeoff through climb to , he was only in the air for about a minute.
Onset of a heart attack indications usually last for at least 10 minutes before the occurrence and the victim usually wants to run to the bathroom as they are happening.
There is no information concerning any such indications and it seems reasonable to conclude that the pilot wouldn't have taken to the air with endeared people on board if he was feeling poorly. Therefore, the probability that he had a heart attack is low in my opinion. Concerning vertigo and spatial disorientation, the artificial horizons AH in a CJ4 are much larger than the 3" instruments in the typical small single or multi-engine piston powered GA airplane.
The focus of the pilot of a business jet just after takeoff is on the AH as he is taught during type rating training to raise the nose to a specific number of degrees of pitch attitude for climb. Just after he acquires that pitch attitude, he probably engages the auto pilot AP to stabilize the aircraft wings level and hold the pitch attitude so that he can reach over and raise the gear, then raise the flaps, and finally engage the yaw damper.
He then can either disengage the AP and fly the pitch and bank for required altitude and heading changes or leave the AP on to hold the pitch and use the heading bug to make heading changes. The point is, he might glance outside during climb out, but won't likely be gazing outside.
The radar flight profile shows that the subject pilot flew the departure as he was supposed to, but something happened at or above feet that disrupted the stabilized flight of the subject aircraft. As I previously described, the meteorological conditions on the night of the accident were indeed conducive to icing.
With no ground lights as he headed out over the lake, he might not have noticed the broken layer of cloud at , the broken layer at , and the overcast at Although radar shows that he was momentarily at feet, he might have gone higher than that and into the overcast at feet where the temperature was below freezing and the air heavily saturated with moisture.
As I previously described, ice can form on a wing very quickly and when that happens on a high performance wing wherein the leading edge is not being heated, the possibility of picking up ice is significant. Therefore, I think that the probability of icing being the cause of this accident is high. Given that the Standard Operating Procedure SOP for bleed air heated wings is to not turn on ice protection until after take off due to power failure considerations, it is quite possible that the subject pilot was not in the habit of even thinking about turning it on just after raising the gear and flaps and turning on the yaw damper.
Unfortunately, turning on ice protection just after take off and clear of local ground obstacles may not have been heavily emphasized during his type rating training. Training records will likely show such lack of emphasis. Having an experienced safety pilot might have helped that shortcoming of training, but there is no wing ice light on the right wing of a CJ4, so even a second pilot might not have noticed ice quickly forming on the wing. Therefore, I think that the probability of this accident having been prevented by a safety pilot is low.
Lack of situational awareness concerning icing is what probably disrupted this flight and led to the accident as I previously described.
However, still the question lingers in my thinking concerning whether or not turning on the ice protection when the pilot realized that his aircraft was no longer stable in flight would have cleared the ice off of his wings quickly enough for the pilot to regain control of the aircraft before it hit the surface water. Again, Cessna can probably figure out the answer to that question. Do you think they will bother? Oh my, I just had a brain storm and follow-on idea!
As you pilots know, by everybody will be required to have ADSB in their aircraft. In exchange for you sending out your coordinates every second or so, you will receive weather information free from your FAA. Well, consider, if every single pilot business jet was required to have an onboard automated icing prognosticator device that uses that free weather information or XM Satellite weather information to determine if icing is likely after takeoff and during climb, such an automated system could present an emergency message to the pilot advising of such potential icing.
Hey avionics makers, jump on that idea! And then you can notify congress that you found a solution to one of their concerns. The Citation Jet involved in the Canadian accident was older and less sophisticated, but the weather ,late night departure ,single pilot operation and short duration of flight would seem to warrant consideration in terms of common factors analysis. The victims ,all friends had a day of golf and dinner before departing for a short flight to Calgary Alberta.
The former Premier of Alberta perished in the accident. There is one more consideration that might have prevented the subject accident. I have no doubt that the subject pilot turned on the landing lights for takeoff. The question is, when did he turn them off or when was he taught to turn them off. Many Airline pilots don't turn off the landing lights after takeoff until after passing feet AGL so that surrounding traffic will notice their aircraft.
If the subject pilot had been taught to do that, he might also have noticed the broken layer of cloud at feet, the broken layer at feet, and the overcast at feet.
On the other hand he might have turned them off when passing the first broken layer at because the landing lights reflected off the clouds and bothered his night vision. Perhaps he found the light reflection a distraction to his effort to crosscheck his instruments with every second look at the artificial horizon AH.
But if he did turn them off, did he turn on the left wing ice light? Did he think about turning his head degrees to the left to glance outside and see if the left wing was picking up ice or was he afraid of giving himself vertigo if he turned his head left and then back to the right rather quickly?
Perhaps there should be lessons about "how to turn your head without giving yourself vertigo when flying an airplane. Perhaps Cessna should redesign the ice light circuit so that the ice light automatically comes on when the landing lights are turned off. That way the single pilot must go to the ice protection panel to turn off the ice light. With that effort he might catch a clue to look outside to see if the left wing is icing, in spite of what little vertigo he might encounter.
He can overcome vertigo by resuming his instrument crosscheck quickly after he looks back at the panel. Holding ones gaze on the AH momentarily helps to make vertigo go away. I think an ice light redesign is in order. Yes, a bird strike could have damaged the de-ice on the right wing. The aircraft maintenance log might shed some light on such repair. Hopefully the maintenance logs wern't in the plane. If in fact the the right wing de-ice wasn't working and the right wing iced up but the left did not, the aircraft would have a propensity to roll to the right.
The pilot's or autopilot's ability to overcome such asymmetric lift with aileron and rudder as well as reduced power on the left side is questionable. An earlier post indicated there was a bird strike before the plane came back into the US.
It did not state which part of the plane was impacted. Who knows to what degree it was properly corrected and inspected. Also, I wonder if, since it was acquired, if it had ever been flown in icing conditions or if it was ever tested to make sure it was working. Pilot was assigned a heading of and initial altitude of '. Data shows the pilot established a heading of and climbed to an altitude of '.
Huge distraction takes place once one realizes they just busted an altitude input wrong initial altitude into selector? Shuts off AP and immediately begins a decent to recapture ' assigned altitude, experiences spatial disorientation and relies on senses instead of instruments, and strikes the lake. My only question would be: After re-capturing assigned altitude of ', how could he continue descending right into the lake? That preliminary report is worse than the initial description of the short flight.
Before takeoff he acknowledged the right turn to and climb to He must have been given a squitter code and a departure control frequency. We know that he put the correct code in his transponder but my question now is, did he preset the correct departure frequency?
I've had many instrument students and always found it necessary to coach them on setting up the radios BEFORE takeoff. Once I let an instrument student takeoff when I knew he hadn't preset frequencies in the radios correctly. After takeoff when tower told him to contact departure, there was major confusion when he pressed a button to change frequencies and departure control didn't answer his call.
Suddenly he wasn't flying his assigned heading anymore, as we were in a shallow right turn, and he became totally engrossed in checking the departure control frequency as we bounced around in turbulence. He finally dialed in the correct frequency and got back to the assigned heading. Fortunately we weren't in Instrument Meteorological Conditions IMC at night and the surface temperature was well above freezing. After that occasion I wouldn't let students takeoff until frequencies were preset correctly and checked and rechecked.
I hope the subject pilot was taught that way. This accident becomes more and more sad the more I read about it. Another theory I may add to my Autopilot is on, altitude preselect is set for the correct altitude of ', the climb is performed in the VS mode. If the pilot isn't satisfied with his existing VS, he reaches up and recommends the desired VS with manual vertical VS wheel.
If this were the case, it disrupts the "ALTS" capture and continues to climb busting through the assigned altitude. A panic ensues to get back on altitude - rotates VS wheel considerable down, doesn't adjust power for the quick descent and quickly gets airspeed above K indicated. As the aircraft rushes through in the barber pole, the CJ4 will want to go into a deeper dive and shut off autopilot.
Now autopilot is shut off, speed is increasing and the pilot goes into a full panic with not much altitude to recover. Add turbulence, gforces, and disorientation to the weather mix and the outcome is not favorable Aircraft took off on runway 24R with wind from at 23 and gusting to Subject pilot never completed the turn to heading as he established a magnetic course of That means that he rolled out on a heading of about He was at after about 20 seconds but should have been pulling back the power after 15 seconds in order to level off at and not exceed knots.
He should have waited until after level off at to call departure. Having flown Mustangs plus the accident airplane and a level D simulator at Flight Safety, he should have been capable of doing that. Controllers can wait, fly the airplane. How hard would it have been for subject pilot to fly manually and make a climbing right turn of 90 degrees and level off at feet with airspeed of about K?
When he initially checked out in his CJ4, he must have done a bunch of touch and goes with a check pilot as well as solo. He must have become proficient at pulling the power back manually just prior to reaching pattern altitude of ft AGL and setting the power to a specific number to fly the downwind at about K. It's highly probable that he knew how to level off at ft on a specific heading of the night of the accident. So why would he be using his autopilot that he may not have been totally familiar with?
The CJ4 doesn't have an auto throttle, so he had to have known that he needed to pull the power back at about ft to level off at , whether he was flying with autopilot or not. So what was the big distraction that took his attention away from the altimeter? Was it the frequency change, the broken layer at , ice protection concerns, some other indication on the panel like a warning light, or a passenger? I suspect we'll never know.
On January 7th at I don't think people realize how demanding an early level off and turn like this is when you have that much thrust The power must be reduced! It can be done safely but you have to have experience and you have to anticipate it. I wouldn't assume the pilot had much experience with this manuever. How many touch and goes do you estimate he might have done when he initially checked out in his newly acquired CJ4 before he was signed off to fly it and carry passengers? Might you know what Flight Safety taught him in their level D simulator?
Aren't there pitch, bank, and power techniques that he needed to master before he could be type rated in the CJ4? I have been flying since and can tell you right now, had I just been certified to fly that complicated aircraft less than a month before I would not have attempted to fly at night. He still needed at least hours of daylight VFR experience. I know a bit about the plane he was flying and I am going to make a far out prediction as to what happened.
It is a simple yet common rookie mistake. When he landed he had the trim tab set in a glide position so he would not have to hold back pressure on the stick. Prior to takeoff he did not return the tab to neutral. After take off, with full power, the tab caused the plane to climb at a rate that caused to to stall. Poor settings, no visible horizon and lack of experience and this is the end results.
This is the similar thing that killed JFK Jr. The role of the elevator trim I agree might have played a role, given the CJ4 trim design. Also the initial assigned altitude maneuver, requiring a rapid power reduction, that was apparently missed and would have been a considerable distraction might have magnified the re-trimming complications.
To me, given the powerplant's enormous capabilities and the very short duration of flight, I'm less inclined to implicate icing as the massive issue unless the aircraft was compromised markedly before the takeoff run.
Concerning the elevator trim: That being said, even with the aircraft trimmed properly for takeoff there is still a fair amount of trimming to do as the aircraft accelerates in the climb. This is not a "runaway trim" condition, but the primary trim could fail in a possible nose up position. Certainly would be a distraction and begin the accident chain.
Someone above asked about touch n goes in training. Its been a long time but I don't ever remember doing touch n goes when I received my type rating. I can't remember all of the exact scenarios we get in the simulator. But, yes, it would be good training to practice a takeoff or two at Burke with the same clearance, at night, IMC, lightly loaded, with a possible CAS message and trim failure.
FlightSafety International on December 17, It will be interesting to see what role that FS Int'l had in the pilots' overconfidence in flying this particular aircraft with limited experience in night time over water. I suppose it'll all come out in the lawsuits: I enjoy reading all the complicated, detailed theories on what happened, I'm not a pilot, but have a lot of theoretical knowledge and my theory on this accident is simple after reading details from the NTSB and other reports from the flight and plane.
I agree with many of you Not even talking about the pilot's currency and experience, the timeline of events leading up to the late departure is absurd. It's risky enough to drive home late from an event, but to launch off into IMC after a really long day Flying in the Air Force and Civil Air Patrol, we always conduct an operational risk management assessment.
One major portion of our matrix is the quantity of rest the night before, and length of day leading up to the flight. Based on the length of his day, from a physiological standpoint, certainly questionable if he was fit to fly. Aviation is serious, and we owe it to our families, passengers, and communities to treat it as such. Common sense is what successful pilots possess. I don't care how many buzz words the FAA comes up with - you can't fix stupid! Kudos to you my friend.
Someone had to say it. Although the pilot didn't have many hours as PIC in the CJ4, he was certified in many other types of complex, high performance including helicopter and probably jets. He must have many flying hours. He had just completed the safety flight training and other training. He was very fresh and proficient. Flying in a 30kts crosswind in a very demanding IFR situation in a new powerful jet late at night could overwhelm him.
He probably tried to correct the overshoot assigned altitude, like someone commented, and crashed. Or he might have a heart attack.
He was definitely not an inexperienced and careless pilot. How clearly ignorant you are. Aviation is not dangerous, aviation has dangers that must be mitigated to an acceptable level. Those dangers includes vindictive people who would do things i. Let no stone go un-turned. You call him "ignorant? Different people have different "acceptable levels" but aviation is inherently dangerous. The surviving families of the two unrelated passengers might have cause to sue the pilot's estate for damages.
In life - what comes around goes around. Even in dangerous aviation - if one were to make it that way. Just remember everyone, you can't fix stupid.
To bad he took neighbors with him. His estate will get sued. For careless, reckless and lack of common sense. Makes the rest of us wonder. CJ typed, 39 years, thousands of hours. Hello, I was wondering if there's been any new developments in the accident investigation? Has any criminal negligence charges been filed? Have a great day! CJ4 aircraft owner not a pilot. I suspect the local news media lost interest in covering the plane crash after a couple of weeks.
Not aware of lawsuits as of this writing. My guess is the family and close friends would have knowledge of any lawsuits for criminal negligence The complexity of this case requires in-depth testing of the salvaged aircraft, engine, component parts, testing data, witness statements, documents, etc.
Once the factual is finished the full NTSB board will review the file and issue a probable cause finding. This process takes several months. So, we're looking at a long wait time for those reports. Wishing you and your pilot s safe flying. Did he feel sorry for you? I'm certain he wanted you to just find another job but like people who just feel entitled they can't go find another job.
What about the oceans in the winter? Are they out as well? It's gonna be a long winter, folks. This comment speaks volumes about the ignorance of the people who post here.
I am shocked that the owner of this site would allow such vile hatred to be published. You have a lot of hatred in your heart and I hope, for your soul's sake, can forgive whatever this crash victim has done to you to post barbaric rhetoric. My prayers are with the families who have been impacted by this tragedy. The CJ4 is a very capable aircraft even in the conditions recorded the night of the accident. Twenty one days since being certified to fly the "4" is nothing. The pilot was flying in challenging conditions, single pilot in a new aircraft to him.
Flying through his assigned altitude leads me to believe he was task challenged in those conditions. When you have that much invested in a relatively new, very nice aircraft, why don't you hire a qualified professional for the left seat? I'm a professional contract pilot and I've written into my contract that at my discretion when I feel challenged by poor weather conditions, challenging busy flight environments, or even when long days are involved, I can hire a second pilot to help with flying duties.
Hey CEO's, quit pinching pennies and hire a professional!! You concentrate on making the the payments and the gas money and let the guy who's only job is to be proficient in your plane save the lives of you and your passengers! To answer the question about when he received his PPL: It says , but that's when it was re-issued with the type rating for the CJ He may have had his PPL for years. I agree with most of the pro-pilots on here. He was way over his head.
If anyone mentioned it I didn't see it, but isn't it at all possible, albeit very unfortunate, that he lost his instruments after rotation? There's not much he could've done other than crashing if he had no instruments under those conditions. The reasons people crash aircraft and automobiles is because something out of the ordinary happens.
If it wasn't abnormal, there probably wouldn't be an incident. So I think it's great to have some speculation to generate conversation, but instantly blaming the pilot shouldn't happen.
There was an auto accident on I65 the other day in Mobile, AL that happened a bit before I left work and I wondered how on earth it happened at that point, with those cars left in that position. Well it just so happened to make the world news because it was caught on video and the guy driving the Jeep was driving in excess of mph and clipped a car exiting I65 and he tumbled out of the Jeep as it flipped 6 times into I65 and was unharmed.
My point is something could've happened beyond our speculation and thought process, such as losing instruments after takeoff. The pilot most certainly couldn't be blamed if that was the case. Nevertheless it could still be pilot error.
He did make some poor choices regardless, but we will never know whether those were the cause or simply a way to place blame. That's why there are "standby" instruments on the plane, in case he loses his instruments. Even if he lost his instruments, he still had an altimeter, airspeed, and attitude gyro. Enough to keep the plane out of trouble in the hands of and experienced pilot. I'm guessing he was allowing Fred to handle the flight duties and when Fred suddenly quit because of turbulence he handed Mr.
CEO a hand full of untrimmed CJ4. Another inexperienced wealthy owner pilot kills himself and his family through overconfidence. How many times do we have to read about this?? Why was it necessary to send him out over the lake at that time of night with no other traffic around. A straight out, climb to cruise altitude, turn left to Columbus would have saved lives. ATC is in no way guilty of anything.
No need to lay guilt on the controllers. I agree with the above comments. Raymond, I am not blaming the controllers, I like them. But, that departure seems unnecessary at night without other traffic was there other traffic? Out over the water, without traffic, why level off at ? Not sure that applies when it is night, turbulence and icing.
This pilot was the decision maker. ATC would have obliged if possible , especially in times of low traffic. The fact is these types of clearances are very common. This guy got way behind the aircraft. I used to be the Q. I have flown out of Burke a number of times and taking off from 24 always received a north departure at 2, over Lake Erie. Some of my departures were at night. There is no outside reference in the gloom, and any equipment failure leaves little or no margin for survival.
Whatever the reason for the departure noise or Hopkins, I believe the latter , it is a challenging departure. It is not fair to accuse this pilot of being behind his airplane until more is known. Every year there are fatal accidents at night due to special disorientation the black hole killer. Most of the accidents it seems have occurred within the first ft of elevation ending in a right turn flying into the ground.
The majority of the accidents were in the private pilot category. BKL is a very challenging takeoff at night for a visual pilot, but this is a story about an IFR flight. I honestly hope the plane broke apart on impact.
It took 20 minutes for ATC to realize the plane was missing and call for a search. Just 2 miles off shore, and rescue impossible. I hope we can all do better in the future. I know the NTSB takes it's time, but we're coming up on 2 years with nothing but a preliminary report.
Isn't that a bit unusual? It makes me think there must be more than meets the eye on this one. I've seen more complicated incidents signed-sealed-delivered in months.
We are "coming up on" 17 months on this case, NOT two years as was suggested two posts ago I think everyone involved here, including families of the victims, wants as accurate of an investigation done as possible, no matter how long it takes.
I don't think anyone would want the NTSB to give a final report that is, say, 7 months off on a timeline, as the above post is. Lets save exaggeration to create drama for another matter please. Do you want it done fast and wrong, or slow and right? Or, maybe you want it done in '87 words or less' The Transportation Safety Board of Canada is in the media focus for releasing final and factual reports in '87 words', sometimes much less. See this post http: The TSB of Canada is silent on mechanical concerns raised before a fatal crash.
It does not reveal that a survivor is a flight instructor who was unable to prevent the crash. It does not reveal that a flight may have violated aviation regulations. It says nothing about a cockpit struggle alleged to have occurred in the very final seconds in a failed bid to abort the takeoff, etc.
Thank you NTSB for not being vague. You give clear and concise answers using the information at hand. The public appreciates your effort! When are we going to have some answers in this case? Here's your hat, what's your hurry?
The final Report is still pending, should be out soon????. I read through the report. It looks like spatial disorientation to me. But I am not an expert. Dark night visual conditions prevailed at the airport; however, the airplane entered instrument conditions shortly after takeoff.
The airplane climb rate exceeded 6, fpm during the initial climb and it subsequently continued through the assigned altitude of 2, ft mean sea level. The flight director provided alerts before the airplane reached the assigned altitude and again after it had passed through it. The bank angle increased to about 62 degrees and the pitch attitude decreased to about 15 degrees nose down, as the airplane continued through the assigned heading. The bank angle ultimately decreased to about 25 degrees.
During the subsequent descent, the airspeed and descent rate reached about knots and 6, fpm, respectively. The enhanced ground proximity warning system EGPWS provided both "bank angle" and "sink rate" alerts to the pilot, followed by seven "pull up" warnings. A postaccident examination of the recovered wreckage did not reveal any anomalies consistent with a preimpact failure or malfunction.
It is likely that the pilot attempted to engage the autopilot after takeoff as he had been trained. However, based on the flight profile, the autopilot was not engaged. This implied that the pilot failed to confirm autopilot engagement via an indication on the primary flight display PFD. The PFD annunciation was the only indication of autopilot engagement.
Inadequate flight instrument scanning during this time of elevated workload resulted in the pilot allowing the airplane to climb through the assigned altitude, to develop an overly steep bank angle, to continue through the assigned heading, and to ultimately enter a rapid descent without effective corrective action.
A belief that the autopilot was engaged may have contributed to his lack of attention. It is also possible that differences between the avionics panel layout on the accident airplane and the airplane he previously flew resulted in mode confusion and contributed to his failure to engage the autopilot. The lack of proximal feedback on the flight guidance panel might have contributed to his failure to notice that the autopilot was not engaged.
The pilot likely experienced some level of spatial disorientation due to the dark night lighting conditions, the lack of visual references over the lake, and the encounter with instrument meteorological conditions. It is possible that once the pilot became disoriented, the negative learning transfer due to the differences between the attitude indicator display on the accident airplane and the airplane previously flown by the pilot may have hindered his ability to properly apply corrective control inputs.
Available information indicated that the pilot had been awake for nearly 17 hours at the time of the accident. As a result, the pilot was likely fatigued which hindered his ability to manage the high workload environment, maintain an effective instrument scan, provide prompt and accurate control inputs, and to respond to multiple bank angle and descent rate warnings. Controlled flight into terrain due to pilot spatial disorientation.
Contributing to the accident was pilot fatigue, mode confusion related to the status of the autopilot, and negative learning transfer due to flight guidance panel and attitude indicator differences from the pilot's previous flight experience. Brian and Megan Casey. Khalid Bahurr, commissioner for Burke Lakefront Airport. Friday, December 30, at Friday, December 30, at 1: Friday, December 30, at 3: Friday, December 30, at 4: Why is taking them so long to locate the aircraft?!?
Friday, December 30, at 5: Friday, December 30, at 6: Friday, December 30, at 8: I am a professional airline transport pilot currently employed as a captain by a major US airline Friday, December 30, at 9: Friday, December 30, at 9: This plane have a CVR? Saturday, December 31, at Saturday, December 31, at 4: PDN Saturday, December 31, at 4: JFC Saturday, December 31, at 5: Saturday, December 31, at 6: Saturday, December 31, at 8: Sunday, January 1, at Sunday, January 1, at 3: Sunday, January 1, at 8: Sunday, January 1, at 9: Sunday, January 1, at 1: Did they get fuel!
Was the cover for the airspeed and static missed before departure? Monday, January 2, at Monday, January 2, at 8: Don't rule out a possible suicide scenario. Monday, January 2, at 9: No type ratings listed? Tuesday, January 3, at 1: Tuesday, January 3, at 5: Tuesday, January 3, at 8: Tuesday, January 3, at Windy Ice prone conditions Night time over water Single pilot flying a jet A long full day for the pilot in command possible fatigue or "gotta-get-there-itus" Wednesday, January 4, at 4: Wednesday, January 4, at 8: Thursday, January 5, at 5: Thursday, January 5, at Thursday, January 5, at 4: Friday, January 6, at Friday, January 6, at 3: Saturday, January 7, at Gust lock system engaged?
Saturday, January 7, at 2: Saturday, January 7, at 3: Saturday, January 7, at 9: Sunday, January 8, at Hey Flight Instructor, I agree. Insurance companies drive the minimums of who flys the plane.
Sunday, January 8, at 1: Insurance companys own the large training centers that type the pilots. Monday, January 9, at 5: Tuesday, January 10, at Tuesday, January 10, at 1: Tuesday, January 10, at 3: Tuesday, January 10, at 5: My husband works for Superior Beverage and was told the dog was on the plane. Tuesday, January 10, at 6: His dog Sandy was not onboard.
Was a beautiful airplane. Tuesday, January 10, at 8: Any information on the Bombardier Global in Colorado this week? Thursday, January 12, at 8: NSB live streaming news conference today at Haven't read about the Global in CO.
Wonder what that's all about. Thursday, January 12, at 9: Thursday, January 12, at Thursday, January 12, at 5: Friday, January 13, at Friday, January 13, at 4: Too bad I have to work, I could watch the dive team all day. Friday, January 13, at 8: Friday, January 13, at 1: In regards to Signature, what is the release of liability all about?
Friday, January 13, at 3: Saturday, January 14, at No auto throttles on the CJ4. Sunday, January 15, at 9: Sunday, January 15, at Sunday, January 15, at 5: Monday, January 16, at 5: Monday, January 16, at Tuesday, January 17, at 1: Tuesday, January 17, at 9: Considering the assumed airspeed at impact, that wing may have arrived separately. Tuesday, January 17, at Tuesday, January 17, at 2: Wednesday, January 18, at 1: Is there disagreement or discontent on this thread?
Wednesday, January 18, at 9: Wednesday, January 18, at Could the bird hit have damaged the de-ice on the right wing? Wednesday, January 18, at 3: Thursday, January 19, at Thursday, January 19, at 1: Thursday, January 19, at 4: Was John's oldest son or his neighbor sharing duties in the cockpit?
Thursday, January 19, at 7: Friday, January 20, at 8: Friday, January 20, at Sunday, January 22, at 2: Sunday, January 22, at 7: Tuesday, January 24, at I think you are correct. Thursday, January 26, at Thursday, January 26, at 3: Friday, January 27, at Tuesday, January 31, at 8: Saturday, February 4, at 8: Saturday, February 4, at 1: Saturday, February 4, at 3: Saturday, February 4, at Sunday, February 5, at 2: CJ4 aircraft owner not a pilot Sunday, February 5, at 5: William Monday, February 6, at 3: Saturday, February 11, at 6: Sunday, February 12, at Peace Thursday, February 16, at Great night to invite the Caseys over for dinner and a cosy evening watching the game.
Thursday, February 16, at 1: Saturday, February 25, at 7: Wednesday, March 8, at Anybody know when the final NTSB rpt will be issued? Wednesday, April 5, at In one of the pictures it appeared that the socks were still on the pitot tubes. Monday, May 15, at 5: Could that have been why he blew through his assigned altitude; and then corrected?
Tuesday, May 30, at 1: Tuesday, November 14, at Sunday, November 19, at Tuesday, January 2, at 1: They found the CVR. What is the hold up on releasing the contents? Friday, January 5, at